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ABSTRACT
This is a study about the protection of human rights by regional human rights bodies. The
thesis identifies the major regional human rights protection systems i.e. the African human rights
system, the inter-American human rights System and the European human rights system.
The paper examines the types of mechanisms employed by each regional system and
examines each mechanism. The three major mechanisms dealt with in this work are inter-state
complaints, state reporting, country reports, finally individual complaints, and execution of the
judgments rendered by these regional bodies.
The thesis analyzes the procedures involved in each of these mechanisms and examines
the rate of success of each mechanism. Finally, it will make a recommendation for each regional
system and each protection mechanism.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Post World War II era has witnessed the flourishing of various international human rights
regimes. Among these regimes are the regional human rights systems. These regional systems
have developed various treaties and provided means for enforcement.
The objective of this paper is to analyze such developments within the context of the
three principal regional human rights systems, i.e. the African, Inter-American and European
human rights systems. In Particular, the paper tries to:
1. Understand the main human rights enforcement mechanism and their applications
within the three principal systems;
2. Assess the contribution of these mechanisms to the protection of human rights with
each regional system, understand contributing factors for their success or failure within each
system, and assess their potential for future use;
3. Identify the lessons to be drawn from one system to another; and
4. Make conclusions and recommendations on how to exploit effectively these various
mechanisms.
The term “enforcement” is used in a very loose sense to include compliance monitoring
mechanisms, such as state and country reports and other strictly execution mechanisms, like
individual complaints and enforcement of decisions of regional human rights bodies. The paper,
however, focuses on principal instruments of the main regional systems.

2
Chapter One deals with general introductory remarks about human rights and regional
human rights systems. It states the advantages these systems have over other international and
national human rights protection systems. It also examines the legal basis and institutional
framework of each regional system. It ends with a brief description of other regional human
rights initiatives.
Chapter Two examines the inter-state complaints. These form one of the mechanisms that
the regional human rights systems utilize. The discussion focuses on understanding how well this
mechanism has been used in the three systems, including exposing the particular way in which
each system incorporated this mechanism. It also aims at understanding possible reasons for
varied levels of exploitation of this mechanism by each regional system.
Chapter Three analyzes the state reporting and country reporting mechanisms. It
examines the availability of these mechanisms in all three systems and how effective they have
been. It also examines how their availability helps regional systems cope with violations of
human rights.
Chapter Four examines individual complaints and execution of judgments against
deviant states. It deals with the normative aspects of regional human rights instruments relating
to individual complaints and execution of the judgments of regional decision bodies. Through its
analysis, it reveals possible underlying weaknesses affecting the performance of each system. It
differentiates between various types of decisions in order to understand what is expected of states
to implement a decision. Finally, the paper will look at the real test, i.e., the actual level of
execution of judgments.
Chapter Five brings the paper to a conclusion. It summarizes what was already
discussed and draws conclusions. Based on these conclusions, the paper additionally makes

3
recommendations to revamp the weaknesses found in these systems. The recommendations are
both system specific and mechanism specific. It recommends the creation of incentives and
disincentives to induce states to act in certain ways. It also focuses on the need to develop new
bodies in some circumstances or use already existing ones in different ways in other
circumstances. The paper also makes recommendations regarding more effective ways of
increasing publicity in some of the systems where less impact is felt.
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Chapter Two
Regional Human Rights Protection Mechanisms: General
2.1 Post-World War II Developments
Following the atrocities of the Second World War, the world witnessed unparalleled
development in international human rights law. 1 New legal regimes, that have the protection of
individuals at their core and aim to a limit the traditionally exclusive jurisdiction of states over
their citizens, emerged. 2
These developments have unfolded at the international,3 regional, 4 and national levels. 5
At the international level, the human rights regime has developed under the auspices of the
United Nations. 6 The United Nations Charter declares that “Promotion and protection” of
human rights as one of goals of the United Nations. 7 Following it, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 9 and International
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 10 were developed. 11

1

CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT , HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 22(2003)
Id.
3
IAN BROWNIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 564(4th ed. 1992)
4
Id, at 574
5
GERALD L NEUMAN, Rights in New Constitutions: Introduction, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REV.1,1(1994)
6
JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 5(2nded. 1998)
7
UN Charter,2nd Paragraph of its preamble, articles 13(1)b , 55,56,62(2)and 68 mention human rights although they
do not contain any substantive rights with them. The only exception to this assertion is equal protection.
8
G.A Res. 217(A),U.N. Doc. A/810,71(1948)
9
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),21 UN GAOR Supp.(No. 16),UN Doc. A/6316(1966)
10
G.A.Res. 2200A (XXI),21UN GAOR Supp(No 16),UN Doc. A/6316(1996)
11
The three instruments form what is known as the international bill of rights; see JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 9(2nd ed.,1998)
2
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In addition to the bodies, directly working within the United Nations system, treaty
bodies were also developed to work within the context of individual treaties. 12
At the national level, national constitutions and other pieces of legislation have increasingly
continued to contain human rights provisions. 13 When African states became independent, for
instance, almost all of them adopted constitutions that guaranteed human rights. 14 Despite
differences in the actual rights content in the various national constitutions, some basic core
human rights are common in most constitutions. 15
At the regional level, human rights protections systems developed independent of the
United Nations system. 16 The United Nations Charter has not made any provision for the
possibility of the development of regional human rights systems. 17 The only reference made to
regional systems was in relation to peace and security. 18 In fact, the United Nations was
skeptical about the development of regional human rights system, fearing that they would
undermine the universality of human rights. 19
The development of regional systems, however, recognized the basic instruments
developed by the United Nations system. The European Convention on Human Rights clearly
refers to Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 20 The African Charter of Human and Peoples’
Rights, in its preamble, states the relevance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 21
More importantly, the Charter allows the African Commission of Human Rights to draw

12

See,e.g., the Human Rights Committee working within ICCPR
ALTSON PHILIP, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS 1-2 (1999)
14
Id, at
15
2 NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never,
3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.L.J.. 45,48(2000
13

16
17

RHONA K.M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 83(2003)

Id.
18
UN charter chapter VIII
19
SMITH, supra note 15, at 83
20
ECHR,Preambular paragraph
21
Banjul Charter Preambular paragraph
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inspiration from other international human rights instruments including, but not limited to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments adopted by the United Nations. 22
The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights also refers to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 23
2.2 Advantages of Regional Human Rights Mechanisms
Regional human rights mechanisms present certain advantages that other protection
mechanisms cannot offer. 24 The likelihood of similarity in cultural, political, and economic
peculiarities among states that are in a region makes it easier to reach agreement on the text of a
common convention. 25 States tend to show more inclination to conform to regional initiatives
than international ones and thus this adds to the advantage of better enforceability to decisions of
regional mechanisms over their international counterparts.26
It is also true that regional organizations are located closer than other international human
rights organizations; they offer a more accessible forum in which individuals can pursue their
cases. 27 The political, cultural, and economic similarity further enables regional systems to offer
better enforcement potential than their international contemporaries. 28 States tend to show
stronger political will to conform to decisions of regional bodies. 29 Regional sanctions can be
more effective than other international sanctions. 30

22

Banjul charter Art. 60
The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted six months before the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ; see Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System : Its Laws , Practice, and
Institutions 55(2001)
24
RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 84(2003)
25
Id.
26
RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 85(2003)
27
Currently the Inter-American system has adopted a system, which allows online applications. This helps further to
minimize the impact of distance., see Rhona K.M Smith , International Human Rights, 85(2003)
28
SMITH, Supra note 27, at 85-86
29
Id, at 85
30
Id.
23
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National enforcement mechanisms function under the political framework of a national
executive and this fact makes them susceptible to intimidation and censure by the executive. 31
2.3 Principal Regional Human Rights Protection Mechanisms
Currently there are three major regional systems. 32 These systems are : the African
human rights system, the Inter-American system, and the European system. 33 In this section, the
paper will briefly discuss the legal basis and normative rules of each of the systems. In the next
section, it will examine the institutional framework of each of these systems. This will facilitate
understanding of the actual enforcement mechanisms of the systems.
2.3.1 Legal Basis and Normative Rules
2.3.1.1 The African System of Human Rights
The African human rights system is organized under the African Union. 34 Initially the
system was anchored in the framework of the Organization of African Unity, which is a
predecessor to the African Union. 35 The Charter of Organization of African Unity made a few
references to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 36
However, it did not contain any catalogue of rights in it. 37 The struggle against colonialism at the
time of the making of the Charter of Organization of African Unity can explain the absence of
any human rights provision within the main text of the Charter. 38 Later developments, including
the decline of colonialism and the awareness of the imminence of end of apartheid, created the

31

The case of three Peruvian judges who were dismissed from their offices after finding against a law that allowed
the president to run for second consecutive time., see Christina M Cerna, The Inter-American System for the
protection of Rights, 16 Fla. J. Int’l L 195,205 (2004)
32
SMITH, supra note 27, at 86
33
Id.
34
U OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 26-27(1997)
35
RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,132(2003)
36

VINCENT O.ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS LAWS, PRACTICE AND
INSTITUTIONS 67(2001)
37
38

Id.
Id.
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impetus to seriously consider developing an African human rights system. 39 The outcome was
the creation of the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. 40 The Charter was
adopted in 1981 in Banjul and in 1986 in Nairobi. 41
The Banjul Charter follows a different approach than other human rights instruments in
that it incorporates all civil, political, cultural, economic, cultural, and social rights together in
the same document. 42 Besides this, the Charter reflects its African identity and experiences by
creating collective rights such as the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources. 43
The concept of individual duties also differentiates the Banjul Charter.44 The duties
include those owed to the family, 45 society 46 , and the State. 47 Another distinguishing feature of
the Banjul Charter is the absence of any general limitation and derogation clauses. 48
The Charter, however, contains “claw-back” clauses attached to each right provision. 49
These clauses, by giving deference to national laws over Charter provisions, undermine the

39

Id.
UMOZURIKE, supra note 31, 26; The African Charter on the Rights of Human and Peoples’ Rights is often
referred to as the Banjul Charter to differentiate it from the OAU Charter.
41
Id, at 26-27
42
NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA, Toward the African Court on Human and peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.L.J.. 45,60-1(2000) ; apart from the Banjul Charter the Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of a Man and the Universal Declaration of Human rights contain all generations of rights in the same
documents.
43
SMITH, supra note 34, 134; The Banjul Charter contains group rights under articles 19-24. These rights include
the right to an existence , the right to international peace and security, and the right to satisfactory environment
44
U OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 64 (1997)
; The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also contains a catalogue of duties.
45
BANJUL Charter art. 29(1)
46
BANJUL Charter art. 28
47
BANJUL Charter art. 29(2)
48
RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 133(2003); currently article 27 is serving as a limitation
clause. Article 27 reads ‘[ ] shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality,
and common [ ] For further discussion on how article 27 has been used as a limitation clause see Christof Heynes ,
The African regional Human Rights System : The African charter, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 679, 692(2004)
49
CHRISTOF HEYNES, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN. St L. REV
679,688(2004)
40
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rights guaranteed by the Charter. 50 The inclusion of such clauses creates national standards of
measure against which the rights of the Charter are measured. 51
The Banjul Convention also allows for deriving inspiration from other international
instruments in interpreting the provisions of the Banjul Charter.52 The African system also
contains other treaties, including Specific Aspects of Refuge Problems in Africa, 53 African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 54 the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 55 and the Protocol Establishing the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Right. 56

2.3.1.2 The Inter- American Human Rights System 57
The Inter-American system is established within the ambit of the Organization of
American States. 58 The system has developed a unique dual system 59 of human rights
protection. 60 Understanding how the inter-American system developed helps one to grasp the
duality aspect of the rights protection of this system. The first system developed out of the

50

Id.; These clauses often times contain phrases like “subject to law’ (art.8), “ provided he abides by law” (art.10), “
in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate laws”(art. 14), see VINCENT O ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM : ITS LAWS, PRACTICE, AND INSTITUTIONS 165(2001)
51
The Commission, however, in Media Rights agenda & Others V Nigeria (case 152/96, paragraph 66) held that
allowing national laws prevail over international standards would render the entire exercise a futile one.
52
CHRISTOF HEYNES, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN. St L. REV
679,693(2004)
53
Id.
54
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/249/49(2000)
55
OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/66.6(2000)
56
OAU DOC.CAB/LEG/66.5(1998)
57
For further reading on the Inter-American human rights system. See : Scott Davidson, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ,1992; Scott Davidson ,The Inter-American System Human Rights System ,1997;
58
CHRISTINA M CERNA The Inter-American system for the protection of Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L.
195,195(2004); OAS is a regional international organization whose membership is open to all American states. See
Scott Davidson, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7-12, 1997
59
Some writers do not describe it as dual but rather treat it as three-route system; see e.g. Christian M Cerna,
International Law and the protection of Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 19 Hous. J. Int 67(2001’l L.
731,740(1997)
60
VINCENT O.ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS LAWS, PRACTICE AND
INSTITUTIONS,54(2001)
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Charter-based system; the other system emanated from the Inter-American Convention of human
rights. 61 One writer has described it as:
In the OAS system, human rights are protected under two interrelated frameworks. The first is
founded upon charter . . . and the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The
second, and more effective, is founded upon the American Convention of Human Rights . . . The
Convention is applicable to only those states that have ratified it, whereas the Declaration is
62
applicable to all OAS member states.

The Charter of the Organization of American States, 63 which forms part of the OAS
Charter-based system, contained and still contains very few references to human rights. 64 In its
preamble, the OAS Charter declares fundamental rights to be “a historic mission of American”
and human rights to be part of consolidation process of the American continent. 65
The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 66 which also forms the second instrument in
the charter-based system, on the other hand, contains a detailed list of rights. 67 It also contains
few duties of man. 68 The rights contained in the Declaration range from civil and political rights
to economic and social rights. 69
The status of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man has been the subject of
much debate. 70 One writer argues that the adoption of the Revised Charter has changed the status

61

SCOTT DAVIDSON, INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 8 (1997)

62

WILLEM-JAN VAN DER WOLF, Indigenous Peoples Rights in International Law, 4 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW,87,107(1991)
63
119 UNTS, entered into force on December 13,1951; Amended by the protocols of Buenos Aires, Cartagena,
Washington and Managua.
64

MARK FREEMAN & GIBRAN VAN ERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 101 (2004)

65

Preambular Paragraphs, OAS Charter
66
OAS Res XXX, adopted by the ninth inter-Conference of American States(1948), reprinted in Basic Document
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L.V/11.82 doc.6 rev 1 at 17 (1992)
67
SCOTT DAVIDSON, INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM,13(1997)
68
See articles 29-38, Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; The Banjul Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights also contain duties in them.
69
70

SCOTT DAVIDSON, INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM ,13 (1997)

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ RESCIA & MARK SEITTLES , The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System :
A Historical Perspective and Modern day Critique, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593,604, (2000)
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of the Declaration. 71 The Revised Charter refers to the Declaration as one of the instruments
containing the catalogue of rights protected by the Charter and this act, according to the same
writer, led to the incorporation of the Declaration into the Charter through reference. 72 Several
writers, taking into account that its adoption gained a unanimous support by the members, even
go to the extent of holding that it has attained regional customary international law status. 73
Moreover, in an advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights opined that the
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man constituted an “authoritative interpretation” of the
fundamental individual rights as expressed in article 33 of the OAS Charter. 74 Still many OAS
member states do not believe it is a binding document. 75 The United States and Venezuela are
the leading members of this group.76
The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which forms the second and main leg
of the protection system, came into existence after its adoption in 1969 and entry into force in
1978. 77 The Convention remedied the weak legal status of the Declaration. 78 The Convention
left out some of the rights in the Declaration and completely left out the duties. 79 The contents of
the Convention include only civil and political rights. 80

71

THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT’L. L.
828, 829( 1975)
72
Id.
73
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ RESCIA & MARK SEITTLES , The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System :
A Historical Perspective and Modern –day Critique, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593,604, (2000)
74
MARK FREEMAN & GIBRAN VAN ERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,102, (2004)
75
CHRISTINA M CERNA, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 16 Fla. J. Int’l. L 195, 196,
2004
76
CHRISTINA M. CERNA, International Law and the Protection of Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 19
HOUS. J. INT’L.. 731, 741-743(1997)
77
A GLEN MOWER,JR, REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE WEST EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
43 (1991)
78
MARK FREEMAN & GIBRAN VAN ERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,103, (2004)
79
Id.
80
RHONA K.M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS , 117,2003; the economic and social rights were replaced
in the convention by a single article(article 26) which obliges states to take appropriate legislative and other
measures for realization of these rights, see A Glenn Mower,Jr. Regional Human Rights : A Comparative Study of
the West European and Inter-American Systems, 46,1991
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Other treaties of the system include the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 the Protocol to Abolish the
Death Penalty 82 and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention, Punishment, and
Eradication of Violence Against Women. 83
2.31.3 The European Human Rights System 84
The European system is set up under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 85 The
principal convention of the system is the European convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 86 It entered into force in 1953. 87 It provided and still provides individual
remedies to violations of human rights by providing common human rights across the board and
including a mechanism for remedying violations. 88
The rights contained in the European Convention are civil and political. 89 The rights
include the right to life, 90 freedom from torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment, 91 right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience and thought, 92 and freedom from
discrimination. 93

81

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ RESCIA & MARK SEITTLES , The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System :
A Historical Perspective and Modern –day Critique, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593,604, (2000)
82
Id.
83
Id, at 594
84
For further reading on the European Human Rights see the following: Clare Ovey & Robin C.A. White, European
Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edition, Oxford University press, 2002; A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe
, 4th Edition, Juris Publishing 2001; P. Van Dijk & G.J.H Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 2nd , Kluwer, 1990
85
86

J.D. MERRILLS & A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 3-5(4th ed.2001)

RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,93(2003)
Id.
88
Id.
89
A GLEN MOWER,JR, REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE WEST EUROPEAN SYSTEMS,53
(1991)
90
ECHR Art.2
91
ECHR Art 3
92
ECHR Art. 9
93
ECHR Art. 14
87
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Additional protocols have added more rights and new structures into the system. Protocol
1 introduces the rights to property, education, and free elections. 94 Protocol 2 provides for the
competency of the European Court of Human Rights to give advisory opinions. 95 Protocol 4
establishes the right of free movement and freedom to choose a place of residence. 96 Protocol 6
prohibits the death penalty in times of peace. 97 Protocol 7 introduces the rights of aliens not to be
deported without due process of law. 98 Protocol 9 gives direct access to individuals in the
court. 99 Protocol 10 reduces the requirements for the adoption of commission reports to simple
majority of the council of ministers.100 Protocol 11 achieves a major restructuring by abolishing
the commission and creating a full-time court. 101
In addition to these protocols, the system contains several conventions. One such
convention is the European Charter, which concerns with economic and social rights. 102 The
Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights is also one such conventions. 103 Conventions
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities are further instruments providing for the protection of human rights in the
Council of Europe countries. 104
2.3.2 Institutional Framework
2.3.2.1 The African Human Rights System
2.3.2.1.1 The African Commission of Human Rights
94

J.D. MERRILLS & A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE ,13 (4th ed.2001)
Id.
96
A GLEN MOWER,JR, REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE WEST EUROPEAN SYSTEMS,55
(1991)
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
J.D. MERRILLS & A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE ,19-20 (4th ed.2001)
100
Id.
101
Id , at 22
102
RHONA S M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,95(2003)
103
Id , at 97
104
Id., at 96-97
95
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The African Commission is a body established by the Banjul Charter with the mandate to
protect and promote human rights on the continent. 105 The Banjul Charter contains many
provisions dealing with the composition, election, and membership of the Commission. 106 The
African Commission carries out its mandate of promoting human rights by disseminating human
rights information, organizing seminars, carrying out research and studies, and encouraging and
assisting national human rights commissions. 107 The African Commission carries out its
preventive mandate by entertaining both inter-state and private complaints, 108 and receiving state
reports. 109 The African Commission can also assume any other functions as provided under its
article 45(4). 110 The commission is a part-time body meeting twice a year for fifteen days. 111
Despite these mandates, the African Commission suffers from serious defects. 112 The
requirement of confidentiality has crippled the efforts of the Commission. 113 All decisions and
activities of the Commission remain confidential until Assembly of the Heads of State and
Government make a decision otherwise. 114 The Commission also suffers from the lack of a
mandate of enforcing its own decisions. 115 States, by appointing high-ranking government
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officials, always compromise their independence. 116 The commissioners have also not been keen
on giving the Banjul Charter its maximum effect. 117
2.3.2.1.2 The African Court of Human Rights
The African Court of Human rights was established by a Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 118 The Protocol establishing the African Court came into force
in 2003 after it got the fifteen ratifications required to come into force. 119 The African Court has
both contentious 120 and advisory jurisdiction. 121 The Protocol establishing it contains several
provisions relating to the composition, structure and appointment of judges. 122
The African Court’s decisions are binding on states. 123 Under the current structure, only
the African Commission and states have direct access to the African Court. 124 Individuals and
NGOs do not have direct access to it. 125 They can only get direct access to the African Court if
states make a declaration to that effect. 126
This arrangement leaves two ways individuals and NGOs can get access to the African
Court. 127 The first way is through states’ recognition of the Court’s competence to entertain cases
of individuals. 128 The second way is when the African Commission takes a case of an individual
before the African Court. 129
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The remaining main issue is to understand how the African Commission will forward
cases to the African Court. The Protocol creating the court does not contain any provisions
dealing with this issue. 130 One writer proposed potential relationships between the African Court
and Commission. The first suggestion assumes that the African Commission will not involve
itself in the merits of the case except to carry out some preliminary fact-finding. 131 The second
suggestion is to have the African Commission carry out partial review of cases, make decisions
on issues like admissibility, and pass cases to the African Court on the merits. 132 The third
scenario is where the Commission fully deals with all individual petitions and making a
recommendation. 133 The case goes to the African Court only when the state against which such
decisions are passed fails to implement the decision. 134
2.3.2.2 Inter-American System Human Rights System
2.3.2.2.1. The Inter-American Commission
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights plays a major role in the protection of
human rights in the region. 135 Originally, the Inter-American Commission was established by a
resolution of the OAS. 136 As a Charter-based organ, it used the Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man to enforce human rights. 137
Article 9 of its Statute enumerated the powers of the Inter-American Commission. 138 The
Commission interpreted article 9 to enable to issue country reports. 139 A country report is an
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enforcement mechanism comprising studies and investigations about the human rights situations
in member countries and finally culminates in the production of Country reports. 140
When a special Inter-American Conference took place in 1965, it revamped the powers of
the Commission by authorizing it to receive individual communications. 141 However, this
empowerment mandated it to receive individual communications only for some rights. 142
The Inter-American Commission gained a more sound constitutional ground when the
Protocol of Buenos Aires amended the OAS Charter making the Inter-American Commission
one of the formal organs of the OAS. 143 This amendment however left issues of procedure and
competence to the American Convention of Human Rights, which came into force later. 144 The
Convention clearly put the powers of the Inter-American Commission into two different
systems. 145 First, the Inter-American Commission has the power to enforce human rights with
regard to non-convention OAS member states. 146 In a case like this, the Inter-American
Commission uses the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 147 The second category of
countries are those subject both to the Declaration and to the Convention. 148
In addition to such protection mandates, the Inter-American Commission also has
promotional mandates. 149 The Statute of the Inter-American Commission deals with various
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issues like the members and other internal matters. 150 The Inter-American Commission also
issues country reports on the situation of human rights in particular countries after carrying out
investigations in those countries. 151
2.3.2.2.2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Unlike the Commission, the Inter-American Court is completely a creation of the
American Convention of Human Rights. 152 The Inter-American Court has both contentious and
advisory jurisdictions. 153 Only states and the Inter-American Commission have standing before
the court. 154 States have to accept expressly the competence of the Inter-American Court before
they become subject to its jurisdiction. 155 Its Statute deals with the Court’s composition and
other internal matters. 156
Finally, it is worth discussing the relationship between the Inter-American Court and the
Commission. Since only states and the Commission have access to the Inter-American Court, the
only was individual cases go to the Inter-American Court is through the Inter-American
Commission. However, there is no guiding principle directing the Inter-American Commission
in making such decision. This area is still left to the discretion of the Commission. 157
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2.3.2.3 The European Human Rights System
2.3.2.3.1 The European Court of Human Rights
Before the establishment of the current system, the European system had both a
commission and a court. 158 Under the current system, there is only the European Court of Human
Rights. 159 The European Court can award damages and make declaratory judgments. 160 The
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Rights has devoted some provisions to
the structure of the court, the qualifications of judges and their appointments. 161 The European
Court sits on committees that decide on the admissibility of a case. 162 The Chamber, which is a
bench of seven judges, decides all inter-state and individual complaints on the merits. 163 The
European Court sits in Grand Chambers of seventeen judges to decide on the merits of all interstate and individual complaints in cases where the Chambers relinquish their powers in favor of
the Grand Chambers. 164 The Grand Chamber also decides on the merits of cases where
applicants request a referral to the Grand Chambers of the decision by the Chambers within three
months time. 165 Decisions of the Grand Chamber are final. 166 This body can also give advisory
opinions if requested by the Council of Ministers. 167
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2.3.2.3.2 Committee of Ministers
The Committee of Ministers is a body of the Council of Europe 168 entrusted with the
tasks of supervising the implementation of the decisions of the European Court of Human
rights. 169 The Committee of Ministers meets only twice a year 170 and operates through deputies
who meet every two weeks 171 and permanent representatives for which the other times during
which it is not in a session. 172 The Committee of Ministers has developed its own rules for
exercising its task of supervising the implementation of the decisions of the court of human
rights. 173
2.3.2.3.3 Commissioner for Human Rights
This is a body established for raising awareness about human rights and respect for
human rights. 174 It was established by a resolution of the Committee of Ministers. 175 Its
mandates include promotion of human rights through education and identification of shorting
coming in law and practice concerning human rights. 176 It also organizes Seminars and conducts
site visits that culminate in country reports like visit reports. 177
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2.4 Other Regional Initiatives
Apart from the principal regional systems considered in this chapter, there are other
initiatives developed for the protection of human rights.178 These systems, for the most part, lack
enforcement mechanisms. 179
2.4 1 Arab Charter of Human Rights
This Charter is created within the framework of the Arab League. 180 Members of the
Arab League have adopted the Arab Charter 181 of Human Rights in 1994. 182 A Revised
Charter 183 came into existence in 2004. 184 The Revised Charter requires seven state ratifications
to enter into force. 185 So far, only Jordan and Tunisia have given their ratifications. 186 Regarding
its contents, the major concern has been that it does not meet international standards. 187 The
Charter recognizes most of the civil and political rights but in most instances leaves out
important component aspects of the rights. 188
2.4.2 European Union
The European Union is a unique supranational organization that has exclusive
competence in certain areas over its member states and operates as an intergovernmental
organization in some areas. 189 Due to its original concern with economic integration, the system
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did not develop formal human rights instruments until very recently. 190 The European Court of
Justice 191 had to develop its own case law to remedy this handicap, drawing inspiration from
international instruments like the European Convention of Human Rights and constitutional
principles common to Member states. 192 Currently the system has a Charter of Fundamental
Rights. 193 However, it remains a mere declaration without the possibility of judicial
enforcement. 194 In an effort to avoid possible contradictions between the European court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, accession of the EU to the European
Convention was suggested. 195
2.4.3 Asia and The Pacific Regions
So far, this region has exerted the stiffest resistance to the concept of human rights. 196
Asian leaders have persistently argued that human rights are particular to the West and do not fit
Asian values and traditions. 197 There have not been any inter-governmental human rights
instruments in this region until now. 198 At present, there is an Asian Human Rights
Charter 199 developed by non-governmental organizations as a declaration. 200 It has been adopted
by many non-governmental organizations as reflective of their position on human rights. 201
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2.4.4 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
Developed out of the need of Africans to prove to the developed countries and financial
institutions that they shared mutual concerns such as good governance and human rights, 202
NEPAD provides the ultimate framework aimed at eradicating poverty from Africa and putting
Africa on a path to sustainable development. 203 The relevant aspects of NEPAD in the present
context are its concern with human rights, 204 and its peer review mechanism. 205 The peer review
mechanism is a voluntary reviewing mechanism 206 whereby African states conduct selfmonitoring. 207 NEPAD’S importance in the protection of human rights is undeniable. 208 The
reviewing takes place through government officials. 209

200

VITIT MUNTABH,, Asia, Human Rights and the New Millennium: The Time for a Regional Human Rights
Charter? , 8 TRANSNAT’L L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 407, 413( 1998)
201
Id.
202
VINCENT O. ORLU NMEHIELLE, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human Rights
Protection in Africa?, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 412,430(2003)
203
Id.
204
DEJO OLOWU, Regional Integration, Development and The African Union Agenda: Challenges , Gaps and
Opportunities, 13 TRANSNAT’L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229(2003)
205
VINCENT O. ORLU NMEHIELLE, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human Rights
Protection in Africa?, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 412,431(2003)
206
Id, at 430
207
DEJO OLOWU, Regional Integration, Development and The African Union Agenda: Challenges , Gaps and
Opportunities, 13 TRANSNAT’L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229(2003)
208
Id at ,229
209
Id; the relevance of the NEPAD peer review mechanism is obvious. However how it fairs with Inter-state
complaint mechanism is yet to be seen at this point in time. Given that, states do not prefer to point fingers at each
other and they feel that they are just doing that when they file inter-state complaint. See Chapter two section 3.2.1).
In addition, given the fact African states have chosen to show unprecedented indifference to human rights violations
on the continent it would remain to be seen how this mechanism would unfold.

24

Chapter Three
Enforcement of Human Rights Under Regional Human Rights mechanisms: Inter-State
Complaints
3.1 Introduction
The term Inter-state complaint, in international law, refers to complaints made by one
state against another before an international body or tribunal alleging a violation of other state’s
obligations. 210 The rationale behind an inter-state complaint mechanism is that states are
interested in the protection of human rights 211 and as such will be diligent participants in such
litigation. 212 Human rights treaties create obligations, firstly, states towards their citizens and,
secondly, towards third states. 213 This secondary obligation forms another legal justification for
the procedure. 214 Currently international human rights systems recognize the inter-state
complaint mechanism as one of the means of human rights enforcement. 215
Generally, two situations explain why states utilize inter-state complaints procedures.
One situation is a purely human rights consideration with no economic or political interest. 216
The case filed by Netherlands, Demark, Norway, and Sweden against Greece was such an
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example. 217 These cases relate to the suspension of certain rights and the alleged torture and
inhumane treatment of citizens of Greece after the Communist regime took power in Greece. 218
The second situation occurs when states have their own interests and concerns. 219 The
case filed by Austria against Italy is a good example. 220 Austria brought a case against Italy
alleging that the way Italy treated German-speaking communities in a criminal investigation of
the murder of an Italian customs officer violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 221
3.2 The African System of Human Rights
The African System recognizes an inter-state complaint mechanism. 222 Under the Banjul
Charter, the inter-state complaint mechanism is a mandatory procedure. 223 Once a state becomes
a state party to the Banjul Charter, it is bound by the inter-state complaint mechanism. 224 The
Banjul Charter provides two different ways of making an inter-state application. The first way
gives a state the option of directly communicating with the state alleged to have violated rights
before going to the African Commission with the complaint. 225 Under this system, a state has a
three-month period during which it must to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem. 226 The
second option is that a state can bring the case directly to the African Commission without the
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need to exhaust the first option. 227 Article 49 228 provides that a state may make an inter-state
complaint directly to the Commission.
Once a member state decides to bring an inter-state complaint against another Member
state, rules begin to apply and the states must meet certain criteria. 229 One such condition relates
to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, exhaustion of domestic remedies does not
apply in cases that involve a vast violation of human rights. 230
The African system has not exploited this mechanism. Only a few inter-state complaints
have, thus far, been made in the life of the Banjul Charter. 231 One is the complaint filed by
Sudan against Ethiopia in 1997 alleging that Ethiopia violated human rights of the local residents
of Kurmmuk and Gissan cities bordering on Ethiopia. 232 Sudan alleged that the Ethiopian Army
invaded these cities and engaged in continuous violations of rights of the residents of these
cities. 233 This inter-state complaint did not succeed 234 because Ethiopia was not a state party to
the Banjul Charter at the time of the complaint. 235
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Another inter state complaint filed was the one Libya made against the United States
following the U.S. bombing of Libya. 236 The complaint was inadmissible because the United
States was not a member to the Banjul Charter. 237
The third inter-state complaint is the one that the Democratic Republic of Congo made
against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. 238 It seems to be the one complaint filed properly since all
parties to the complaint were state parties to the Banjul Charter. 239
Given the widespread violation of rights and abuse of power in the region, 240 the interstate complaint mechanism should be used more frequently. One writer ascribes hesitance by the
African states to use the inter-state complaint mechanism to their highly protective attitudes
toward their very recently gained sovereignty. 241
3.3 The Inter-American System
The inter-American system of human rights recognizes the right of states to file against
another for alleged violations of human rights. 242 The Inter-American Convention provides that
only states that have accepted the competence of the Inter-American Commission to entertain
inter state complaints where the state is either the complaining or the responding party in such
cases. 243 This Inter-American System made inter-state complaints voluntary, leaving it to
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member states whether to join this procedure or not. 244 So far, only few states have accepted the
competence of the Inter-American Commission to receive inter-state complaints. 245
In addition, the inter-state complaint is subject to some procedural requirements.
Domestic remedies must be exhausted; there is a six-month time limit for the filing of such interstate complaints after the notification of the final decision on the case, and a requirement that the
subject matter of the case not be pending in another international dispute settlement body. 246
After the Inter-American Commission carries out its investigation, it will try to reach a friendly
settlement and report its findings to the Secretary-General of the OAS. 247 If such a settlement is
not reached, the Inter-American Commission draws up a report and sends it to the state parties to
the litigation. 248 If either state disagrees with the report and brings the case to the attention of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and it does entertain the case, the Inter-American Court
will have the final say on the case. 249 Otherwise, the Inter-American Commission will pronounce
its final recommendation and fix the time for compliance by the deviant country. 250
So far, there have been no inter-state complaints filed. 251 One writer has forwarded
possible suggestions explaining why this procedure has not been used in the region. One problem
he identifies is the existence of other procedures available to the Inter-American Commission
and use of these procedures by various bodies might have contributed to non-exploitation of this
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procedure. 252 The ability of the Inter-American Commission to take up matters at its discretion
might also have compromised the use of this procedure. 253 Moreover, the particular history of
the region particularly the non-intervention policy, has also explained the reluctance of states to
avail themselves of this procedure. 254
3.4 The European Human Rights System
The European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the inter-state complaints
procedure as one of its enforcement mechanisms. 255 Article 33 256 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Rights provides that a state can bring a case against another if it
believes that the latter is violating human rights. Under the European human rights system, this
mechanism is mandatory on all Member states. 257 A state making inter-state complaints need not
have an interest in the case. 258 The inter-state complaint mechanism is not a means to advance
self-interest but rather part of an enforcement mechanism aimed at maintaining the “public order
in Europe.” 259 This inter-state complaint mechanism is also available to a state, which wants to
bring an action to force another state to implement decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights. 260
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After receiving about twenty-one inter state complaints, this system has seen the highest
number of such complaints from the three principal systems. 261 These twenty-one complaints,
however, relate to seven situations. 262
Two of the cases are the cases filed by Greece against the United Kingdom. 263 Both these
cases relate to the United Kingdom’s colonial rule in Cyprus and the various laws and practices
in Cyprus that allegedly allowed corporal punishment on males below eighteen and summary
punishment and hence violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 264 Following two
recommendations by the European Commission, the Committee of Ministers resolved that no
further action was needed after taking into consideration the agreements of Zurich and London,
which focused on the independence of Cyprus. 265
Another inter state complaint is the one filed by Austria against Italy alleging the
inhumane treatment of the local German-speaking community in a criminal investigation of the
murder of an Italian customs officer violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 266 In
relation to this case, the Committee of Ministers 267 resolved that there was no violation of the
European Convention. 268
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The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark filed four cases 269 against Greece for
violating the rights of Greece citizens by suspending certain rights and allegations of torture and
inhuman treatment following the taking of power by the communist regime in Greece. 270
Regarding this case, the Committee of Ministers passed two resolutions. In the first resolution, it
held that Greece had violated a number of provisions of the European Convention. Additionally
it held that there were no further grounds for action, as Greece had already renounced the
Convention and its membership in the Council, but held to follow up on the situation in that
country. 271 In the second resolution, the Committee of Ministers held to discontinue its follow-up
development in Greece as the re-admission process had examined all relevant aspects
thoroughly. 272
Ireland brought two cases against the United Kingdom. 273 The cases involved the
allegations that the interrogation techniques used by the U.K. authorities amounted to torture and
thus violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 274
Cyprus launched a different set of inter state complaints against Turkey. 275 They alleged
violations of the European Convention by the Turkish military operations in northern Cyprus in
1974. 276 In relation to Communications 6780/74 and 6950/75, the Committee of Ministers
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passed a resolution urging the two sides to resume talks and declassified the case. 277 In relation
to case 8007/77, the Committee of Ministers did not make any resolution except adopting the
report of the Commission. 278 In relation to case 25781/94, the European Court of Human Rights
made a finding of fourteen violations since the time of invasion of Cyprus. 279
Another group of inter-state complaints includes those by France, Norway, Denmark, and
the Netherlands against Turkey regarding the widespread and systematic violations of rights
during its military regime, which lasted from September 1980 to July 1982. 280 The Committee of
Ministers acknowledged an agreement reached between the complainant states and Turkey and
resolved to recognize it as a friendly settlement. 281
Denmark also brought a complaint against Turkey claiming that the latter had tortured a
Danish man who was in detention in Turkey. 282 The two countries made a bilateral treaty in
which Turkey obligated itself to end the practice of torture in the country and pay Demark
damages. 283 The Court also acknowledged the agreement as a friendly settlement. 284
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Chapter Four
Enforcement of Human Rights under Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: State
Reporting and Country Reports
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the focus will be on the reporting system as a human rights enforcement
mechanism. The reporting system can take either the form of a state report or a country report.
This chapter examines how these mechanisms developed in the various regional systems and
how they work within these systems and the advantages it offers over other human rights
enforcement mechanisms.
State reporting refers to the communication made by a state to a specified treaty or
charter body regarding the reporting state’s compliance with treaty obligations from time to
time. 285 Most United Nations treaties 286 and other regional bodies require states to submit a
periodic report. 287 After the submission of the report, what usually follows is the examination of
the reports that will culminate in posing questions to the reporting state. 288
State reporting is based on two assumptions. The first assumption relates to the impact of
publicity on the conduct of states who are reporting. 289 No state wants to stand out as a deviant
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from the standards of international law. 290 Publicity serves as the catalyst for prompting the
international community to respond to the deviant state. 291 It is true that states want to avoid
publicity of their delinquency as much as possible. 292
The second assumption is that state reporting offers the reporting state with a chance to
reflect on their internal human rights situation while preparing the report. 293 State reporting also
helps them to engage in a constructive dialogue with the examining body; 294 state reporting is
not confrontational and adjudicatory295 and helps states find out their policy issues and reflect on
possible future improvements. 296 As most reporting regimes recognize the input of NGO
submissions, state reporting can also facilitate the participation of various segments of the
society. 297 It also helps the examining body to identify recurring problems with states’
compliance and devise possible remedies. 298 Of the principal regional systems, only the African
system explicitly recognizes this system. 299
4.2 State Reporting
4.2.1 The African Human Rights System
Article 62 300 of the Banjul Charter states: “Each state party shall undertake to submit
every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative
measures taken with the view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and
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guaranteed by the Charter.” Article 62 301 poses a general obligation of reporting on all state
parties without specifying who is the competent body to receive, 302 and examine such reports, 303
or what the contents of the reports should be, 304 or how the reports are submitted and
presented. 305
Subsequent actions have addressed many of these issues. The Assembly of Heads of State
and Government bestowed the Commission with the competence to receive such
communications. 306 This authorization followed a recommendation by the Commission asserting
that it was the only competent body to receive such reports. 307 In the same decision, the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government addressed the issue of the contents of the state
reports by authorizing the African Commission to issue guidelines on reporting. 308 Pursuant to
such authorization, the Commission developed its first guidelines prescribing what the reports
should contain. 309
The first reporting guideline addressed, in a very detailed manner, what issues the reports
should tackle. 310 The guidelines require the report to handle various rights under subject matter
organization rather than a particular right contained in the Banjul Charter. 311 It organized the
reports under seven different headings. These are: civil and political rights, 312 Economic and
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social rights, 313 peoples’ rights, 314 specific duties under the Charter, 315 elimination of racial
discrimination, 316 and elimination of discrimination against women. 317
A second guideline, developed in 1997, complemented the first guidelines after it was felt
that the original guideline was unnecessarily detailed from a practical point of view. 318 The
complementing guideline is only a page long, 319 unlike the original guideline, which was about
twenty-five pages long. 320 The newer guideline prescribes concisely what the content of a report
should be. 321 Several writers express their fears that such widely constructed guidelines might
not provide guidance sufficient to produce a report that meets the standards the African
Commission can effectively use. 322 The revised guideline provides that a reporting state should
include a brief statement about its legal system, form of government, relations between various
branches of the government, and urges the production of copies of basic documents like the
constitution and basic codes along with the initial reports. 323
Regardless of these efforts, state practices have been very varied. 324 African states have
been neither diligent on timely reporting 325 nor provided relevant and sufficient information in
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their state reports. 326 As of March 17, 2006, about seventeen states had not yet submitted their
initial state reports. 327 These countries include Botswana, Central African Republic, Cote
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Sao Tome Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zambia. 328 Even
most of the states that submitted reports did so by lumping together many overdue reports. 329
Such practice was motivated by a decision of the African Commission to allow states to combine
overdue reports in one to submit them as a single report.330
A claim was made that twelve states were on time with their submission of reports. 331
This claim, however, hides the fact that such combined reports reduce the number of reports that
should have been submitted. 332 As at March 2006, no state was up to date with submission of
reports. 333
The problem does not end with timely submission of reports. The content and form of the
reports pose another problem for the efficiency of this mechanism. 334 The reports submitted
substantially vary in both content and length. 335 One state report submitted by Algeria to the
nineteenth session of the African Commission, for instance, was ninety-six pages whereas the
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report of Mozambique was only seven pages long. 336 This difference between the two reports
means a big difference in the content and specificity of the report.337 Surprisingly enough, the
report of Seychelles submitted to the twenty-third session of the African Commission was
comprised of only the constitution of that state. 338 Zimbabwe submitted its report to the twentysecond session of the commission and its report was sixty-three pages long and touched upon
every right contained in the Banjul Charter. 339
4.2.2 The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American human rights system does not provide for state reporting as one of its
enforcement mechanism. 340 However, it bestows on the Inter-American Commission the power
to request state reports from member states regarding their human rights situation. 341
Because the Inter-American Commission has exercised broad powers in relation to country
reports and used this tool aggressively, the development of country reports 342 has greatly
undermined the potential development and subsequent utilization of the state reporting option in
the Inter-American human rights system. 343 In addition, the Inter-American Human Rights
Convention places an obligation on states to put measures in place to implement social,
economic and cultural rights progressively as enshrined by implication in the Charter of OAS. 344
States submit reports to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and Inter-American
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Council of Education, Science and Culture on the measures they took in implementing
Convention rights. 345 States are also required to forward these reports to the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights. 346 This reporting system has not been nurtured toward
independence and has been used as a source of information for the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights in its country reports. 347 The practice of using such state reports as one source
in country reports is not uniform due to the irregular practice of the Inter-American Commission
in this regard. 348
4.2.3 The European Human Rights System
The European system does not have a developed state reporting mechanism. 349 The European
Convention on Human Rights, however, provides that the Secretary General of the Council could
request member states to produce reports on how it is implementing the rights of the European
Convention. 350 Initially such requests were made to all states. 351 However, this did not prohibit
the Secretary General from singling out specific states. 352 Recently, the only time the Secretary
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reporting at all. The small details that the African Commission gives in its annual reports can
hardly be described as country reports.
4.3.2 The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American system makes up country reporting for the non-existence of a state
reporting mechanism by developing a country reports mechanism in its system. 363 However, the
Inter-American Commission did not put a clear and specific mandate provisions in the InterAmerican Convention of Human Rights. 364 The Inter-American Commission developed this
mechanism through its own ingenuity. 365
The Inter-American Commission used various provisions in the 1960 Statute of the InterAmerican Commission to claim it had the mandate to issue country reports. 366 The provisions 367
it relied on to assume the mandate of issuing country reports include its power to prepare studies
or reports as it deemed necessary on the implementation of the Inter-American Convention by
the states, 368 the power to make recommendations to states, 369 and the power to move into the
territory of a state with the state’s consent. 370 Country reports were the major mechanisms used
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during the era when military regimes were common in the Americas. 371 These reports made up
the bulk of the agenda of the General Assembly of the OAS during these times. 372
The Inter-American Commission decides on which country it will prepare a country
report. 373 However, it follows certain criteria in making the selection. 374 High numbers of
complaints against a state can trigger a decision by the Inter-American Commission to launch
this mechanism on that state. 375 The country report on Chile is an example of this. 376 The InterAmerican Commission, in its annual report, has enumerated the criteria it uses to select countries
that would become subject to this procedure. 377 The grounds include suspension of any of InterAmerican Convention and Declaration rights; 378 undemocratic governments; 379 and any
evidence of any gross violations of rights. 380
A state can also request the Commission to prepare a country report on it. 381 A country
report on Panama was the result of such initiative. 382 Usually states make such requests when
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they want to amass diplomatic support and publicity for their new policies. 383 They can also
follow a request from any of the inter-governmental organizations of the OAS. 384 The country
report on Bolivia resulted from such a request from the Permanent Council. 385
In the course of preparing country reports, the Inter-American Commission can resort to
seeking information from the state concerned and other governmental and non-governmental
agencies, 386 hearing witnesses, 387 conducting site visits 388 and even resorting to individual
complaints. 389 Ideally, the country reports result from site visits. 390 Initially, the entire
Commission as a body conducted the site visits. 391 Later on, sub-committees carried out the sitevisits, 392 and, even later, they were done by a representative. 393 The mission during the visit
should be to have access to jails, power to interview individuals, and get any information from
any source including the government. 394 These powers, among others, were included in the
regulations and resolutions developed by the Commission regarding site visits by the
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Commission. 395 In the event that a physical visit is impossible, the Inter-American Commission
conducts interviews and refers to other documents to gather appropriate information. 396 The
Inter-American Commission, for instance, had conducted its fact-finding from Miami when it
was preparing its country reports on Cuba. 397
The Inter-American Commission has been very effective in ascertaining the facts on the
grounds. 398 Site visits have enabled the Inter-American Commission to establish detailed
facts. 399 The reports have occasionally been targets of severe criticisms from states. 400
In terms of Content, these country reports begin by discussing the description of the
overall political and legal system of the country. 401 Comparisons of their domestic legal
principles with international counterparts follow. 402 The Inter-American Commission can also
use individual communications in its reports. 403 The rights frequently examined in these reports
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Regulations Regarding On Site Visits Observations, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.35,doc. 4,rev. 1 ; see for instance , articles
44 and 45 of these regulations providing that the host state should provide the Commission with all necessary
facilities and that the commission has the mandate to interview persons freely , in private and that the government
shall warrantee the safety of such persons and that it shall have the right to travel freely within the country including
jails ands other detention centers.
396
Id.
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CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGO, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS AND INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM,237(1988)
399
For instance, in a loco visit in Nicaragua in 1978, the Commission was able to establish that the existence of
willful extermination the population of certain areas suspected of harboring rebels , leveling to the ground of
churches and schools by government forces, how the assassination of two Red Cross workers was orchestrated and
how the government troops killed a 12 year old boy due to his services to the Guerillas.; see Id, 237
400
See, for instance, the reaction of Argentina to the country report made against in
1980(OAE/Ser.P,AG/CP/doc.256/80,29). The Argentine government described the role of the Commission as a
prosecutor , and stated that it was biased and lacked objectivity and fairness , claimed it solely relied on individual
communications over which Argentina was not given a chance to rebut. For further discussion on the reaction of
Argentina see Thomas Buergenthal et al, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas : Selected Problems, 1691670,1982; see also the reaction the Nicaraguan government to the country report on Nicaragua of 1978. The
government claimed that the Commission merely talked to the opposition and the whole report was on hearsay or
propaganda of the socialist guerillas. See Cecilia Medina, Quiroga, The Battle for Human Rights: Gross, Systematic
Violations and the Inter-American System,237, 1988
401
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ RESCIA & MARCH SEITLES, The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System:
A Historical Perspective and a Modern –Day Critique, 16 NYL SCH. J HUM. RTS., 593,606(2000)
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CECILIA MEDINA , The Role of Country Reports in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 15 NQHR
457,463(1997
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are civil and political rights. 404 However, the practice has changed to include occasional
discussions of social and economic rights. 405 This practice, however, is so irregular that it is very
difficult to ascertain whether economic and social rights form part of the reports. 406
Country reports often end with conclusions 407 and sometimes the Inter-American
Commission can include recommendations. 408 Currently states get a chance to express their
observations regarding the report. 409 This practice developed after states bitterly criticized the
reporting mechanism for not giving them a chance to respond to reports. 410 However, the final
decision on the contents of such reports remains with the Commission. 411
The recommendations in the reports vary significantly. 412 Reports can recommend that
states reform their systems to avoid prospective violations. 413 The Inter-American Commission
can also request states to investigate certain incidents. 414 Country reports reach the General
Assembly of the OAS after their completion. 415 This aspect ensures the involvement of the
political organs of the OAS and creates an environment that can exert pressure on states to
comply with the recommendations. 416 However, it was not until 1976 that OAS political organs
discussed country reports. 417 In the period from 1976 to 1980, the OAS carried out a thorough
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discussion on country reports and even passed decisions condemning them. 418 In the post-1980
period, the OAS has avoided condemning a specific country and just dealt with violations in
general. 419
The follow-up procedure developed by the Inter-American Commission follows either issuance
of new country reports 420 or just small reports included in its annual reports. 421 The efficacy of
the country reports depends on the consequences that follow country reports. 422 A country report
is published 423 and transmitted to the General Assembly of the OAS for discussion. 424 The
debate that ensues following submission of country reports attracts a lot of publicity concerning
that state. 425
So far, the biggest weakness in the country reports mechanism lies in the way the InterAmerican system has been using country reports. 426 The OAS General Assembly might not take
firm stand on the reports. 427 However, apart from the decisions to be made by the General
Assembly, the issuance of reports has met with some success. 428
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Id;
Id.
420
The Commission produced seven country reports on Cuba.; see also the 2 nd and 3 rd country reports on
Columbia. In third report, the Commission followed up on the level of compliance with its recommendations
regarding paying compensation to victims. It found that Colombia issued a law facilitating the payment of damages
to those “judgment-creditors” from international bodies of which the Inter-American Commission was one.; see
third Report on Human Rights Situation in Columbia, OAE/Ser. L./V/II.102 doc. 9 rev.1,26 February 1999);see also
the 1988 and 1990 country reports on Haiti. The 1990 report, under paragraphs 25-40, reiterated its finding in its
1988 report. See generally report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, OAE/Ser. L.V./II.77 rev. 1 doc. , 18
May 1990, paragraphs 25-40. However, the 1995 Country report did not mention anything about the earlier ones.;
see OAE/Ser.L V./II/77.rev., 9 Febraury 1995
421
The 2003 report on Haiti as included in the annual report of the Commission took up the issue of victims of
armed conflict in Colombia which it had raised in its 2002 annual report. See Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.114 doc. 5 rev. 26 April, 2002, paragraphs 27-30
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Id; see for instance, The Resolution(Resolution I) passed by the General Assembly dealing with human rights
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4.3.3 The European Human Rights System
The European system does not recognize country reporting under its principal
instruments. However, through a resolution the Committee of Ministers have created and
authorized the Commissioner for Human Rights to visit reports. 429 The reports can be annual 430
or be on particular issues and states. 431 Annual reports generally reflect general human rights
situations in Member states and even focus on particular groups. 432 Other reports are either
general reports on particular countries 433 or may pursue a thematic or even group focused
pattern. 434 The Commissioner also carries out follow-up reports with the aim of ascertaining

international incident surrounding the border areas between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Generally see Cecilia
Medina Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, 243,
1988. On the other hand, the General Assembly expelled Cuba from OAS membership after considering the 1962
country report against Cuba. A closer look at the operative part of the resolution, however, might suggest that even
earlier resolutions might have been motivated by political than human rights considerations. These paragraphs
exclusively focused on the fact that Cuba was Marxist-Leninist state., see sixth Report on the Situation of Political
prisoners in Cuba, OAE/Ser.L.V/II.48 doc 24, 14 December 1979, paragraph 2 ; see Resolution II against
Nicaragua in which the General Assembly resolved that the government of Nicaragua should be removed from
power.
428
For instance, Colombia made a law making payment of damages automatic on decisions made by international
bodies like the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights following a recommendation of the in its second
country report on Colombia. The impact of such laws is tremendous on human rights situation in Colombia. See
Third Report on Human Rights Situations in Colombia , OAE/Ser.L/V/II.102 doc. 9 rev. 1, 26 February 1999,
paragraph 5 ; the Peruvian Government indicated that it was preparing two bills on indigenous peoples of Peru in
response to the recommendations made by the commission ; see Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Peru, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc.59 rev. 2 June 2000, n 12 & 13
429
Resolution (99) 50, www.coe.int (last visited on may 10/2006)
430
Art. 3/h, Resolution(99) 50
431
Art.3/f,Resolution(99) 50
432
See, for instance, 3rd Annual Report, CommDH(2003)7, www.coe.int (last visited on May 10/2006); In this report
the Commissioner ..
433
The Commissioner intends to visit all member states within his 6 years in his office. See
www.coe.int/T/Commissioner/activities/visits_en.asp ; After visiting member states, the commissioner produces
reports about human rights situation in these countries he visited. So far countries about which reports have been
produced include Russian Federation, Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy , Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Italy, and
Czech Republic; See generally www.coe.int (visited on May 10/2006) to see the countries on which a report has
been produced.
434
See, for instance, Report by Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights , Kosovo: The Human Rights
Situation and The Fate of Persons Displaced From Their Homes, CommDH(2001)11, October 16/2002 ,This report
relates specifically to addressing the issue of displaced persons; see also the Final Report by Alvaro Gil-Robles,
Commissioner for Human Rights , on the Human Rights Situation of the Roma, Sintis and Travellers in Europe ,
CommDH(2006)1,15 February 2006, www.coe.int (visited on May 10 , 2006); This report addressed the issues
relating to Roma in relation to housing, segregated schools, access to employers and health care issues.
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whether states have complied with his recommendations. 435 At times, the request for the reports
comes from the Parliamentary Assembly. 436 Sometimes, it comes from the states themselves. 437
During the country visits, the Commissioner visits many locations and sites such as detention
facilities and prisons. Doing this contributes to the report’s objectivity, and first hand
information it contained in the reports. 438 Usually reports do not contain a recommendation to
the Parliamentary Assembly or to the Committee of Ministers. 439
One is bound to ask how much this reporting system has contributed to improving human
rights situations in Europe. The readings of the follow-up reports seem to suggest that there is a
positive trend. 440
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See, for instance, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, On His Visit to Norway ,
12-14 April 2001, CommDH(2001)4 and Follow-up Report on Norway(2001-2005), Assessment of the Progress
Made in Implementing the Recommendations of the Council of Europe for Human Rights, CommDH(2006)10,
www.commissioner.coe.int (last visited May 10,2006)
436
See, for instance, Report by Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights Situation and The Fate of
Persons Displaced From Their Homes, CommDH(2002)11, 16 October 2002, www.coe.int (last visited May
10,2006); In the report, the request came from the Parliamentary Assembly requesting the Commissioner for human
Rights to study the situation and present a report to it.
437
See, for instance, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for human Rights , On His Visit to Malta 2021 October 2003, February 12,2004, CommDH(2004)4, www.ceo.int (visited on May 10,2006)
438
See, for instance, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights , On his visit to the
Russian federation, In Particular Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, 7-10 December 1999, CommDH(1999)1,
www.coe.int (visited May 10,2006). In preparing this report, the Commissioner visited many sites including small
towns, which were demolished due to bombs, and even a site, which was blown just tow hours prior to his very visit.
439
One exception to this is the recommendation made by the Commissioner for Human Rights to the Council of
Europe that it should send staff to assist efforts made by the Russian Government to receive and entertain private
complaints regarding human rights abuse in Chechnya and also that the council should contribute financially to
these efforts. See the Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights , On his visit to the
Russian federation, In Particular Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, 7-10 December 1999, CommDH(1999)1,
www.coe.int (visited May 10,2006).
440
In most follow-up reports found on the Council of Europe’s website, it has been noted that states improved their
human rights situations by taking the recommendations of the Commissioner for human Rights. For instance , in
follow-up report regarding Norway , the commissioner indicated that Norway complied with the recommendations
of the Commissioner relating to asylum seekers, racism, and non-discrimination by adopting rules and procedures to
facilitate the processing of asylum applications and also put in place “ plan of action against racism and
discrimination. See generally Follow-up Report on Norway (2001-2005), Assessment of the Progress Made in
Implementing the Recommendation of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH(2006)10,
www.Commissioner.coe.int (visited May 10,20060; see also the follow-up Report indicating the changes made by
the Maltase government in response to visit and report of the Commissioner. Malta has put new administrative
practice that changed the practice of detaining asylum seekers from 18 months to 12 months. Such a change that
complies with the recommendations of the commissioner is commendable.. See generally Follow-up Report on
Malta(2003-2005), Assessment of the Progress Made in Implementing the recommendations of the council of
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 29 March 2006, CommDH(2006)14, www.coe.int (May 10, 2006).
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Chapter Five
Enforcement of Human Rights under Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: Individual
Complaints and Execution of Judgments
5.1 Introduction
International human rights law broke ranks from traditional international law 441 and
established a system of law that has the protection of individuals at its center.442 This
development in international human rights brought about a corresponding development in its
individual-centered enforcement mechanisms. 443 Using such mechanisms, individuals can resort
to an international body or tribunal to hear the cases they bring against states for violating their
human rights. 444 In the United Nations system, various treaty and Charter bodies can receive
individual petitions. 445
Treaties establishing these bodies often include an implementation mechanism which
allows “judgment –creditor” state to enforce the decisions of these international bodies against
“judgment-debtor” states. 446 These remedies suffer a major mutilation when it comes to
enforcing them because of the contemporary Organization of international law that has states as

441

Under traditional international law system only states and to certain extent international organizations can
participate in its processes. Individuals are not subjects of any rights or duties under this corpus of law; see Mark
Freeman & Gibran Van Ert, International Human Rights Law, 5, 2004
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MARK FREEMAN &GIBRAN VAN ERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 7( 2004)
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RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 145( 2003)
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Id.,148
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See, for instance, Convention Against Torture (CAT) art. , Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) art. , Human Rights Committee, and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women(CEDAW) art.
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RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 148(2003)
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the main constituent units. 447 Parallel to this international system are the regional human rights
systems. They have also developed individual-based enforcement systems. 448
5.2 The African Human Rights System
The Banjul Charter, under article 55, 449 mandates the Commission to receive
communications other than those of states. It provides :
1. Before each session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications other than
those of states parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the Commission, who shall
indicate which communications should be considered by the commission.
2. A Communication shall be considered by the commission if a simple majority of its members so decide.

This broad mandate has developed into the practice of accepting communications from
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 450 One writer argues that the African
Commission does not have the mandate to remedy individual cases. 451 He maintains that the
African Commission can receive individual cases to the extent that they reveal “massive
violations” 452 of human rights. 453 Another writer also shares this opinion. 454
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The international law still has states as its basic founding units and has “sovereignty” at its core. This is a concept
that allows exclusive power to states within their territories. This concept has been a big impediment to the level to
which decisions of international or regional organs are enforceable; see Mark Freeman & Gibran Van Ert,
International Human Rights Law, 4, 2004
448
RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 148(2003)
449
Banjul Charter art. 55
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CHIDI ANSELM ODINKALU & CAMILLA CHRISTENSEN, The African Commission on Human and peoples Rights :
The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures, 20 HUM. RTS Q. 235, 239)1998) ; see also Christof
Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 Penn. St. L. Rev. 679,694,2004
451
WOLFGANG BENEDICK, The African Charter and Commission on Human and peoples Rights : How to make it
More Effective , 11 NQHR 25, 31(1993)
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Medina has defined massive violations of human rights as “ Gross , systematic violations of human rights are
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In handling individual complaints, the African Commission first tries to reach a friendly
settlement. 455 This practice flowed from article 52 456 of the Banjul Charter dealing with interstate complaints and declaring that in an inter-state mechanism a friendly settlement should
precede adjudication of the same. 457 The African Commission proceeds to checking the
communication for admissibility 458 and decides the merits of the case once the friendly
settlement attempt fails. 459 Article 56 460 of the Banjul Charter enumerates those admissibility
requirements. 461 When dealing with the merits of the case, 462 the mandate of the African
Commission is very weak. 463
The ultimate power of the African Commission is limited to making a recommendation to
the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government. 464 It does not have any credible
enforcement mechanism. 465 It has not developed any follow-up procedure to monitor states’
compliance with its decisions. 466
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CHIDI ANSELM ODINKALU & CAMILLA CHRISTENSEN, The African Commission on Human and peoples Rights :
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Banjul Charter art. 52
457
Id.
458
Admissibility is different from receivebility. A petition is irrecievable, when for instance, is brought against a
state, which is not a state party; see Odinkalu & Christensen, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights : The Development of its Non-state Communication Procedures, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 235, 294,& n 11; see also
Eveleyn A Ankuamh, The African Commission on Human Rights : Practice and procedures, 56-58, 1996
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Banjul Charter art. 56
461
Article 56 gives the following as admissibility grounds:- disclosure of authors’ identity, compatibility of the
Communication with the provisions of the Charter, use if insulting language against the respondent state, its
insitutions or the African Union, exclusive dependence (reliance) on media for the alleged violation,exhaustion of
domestic remedies, submission of the communication with a reasonable time after final dicision of the domestic
organs, and cases not dealt with and settled before.
462
After admissibility of individual complaints is settled , the parties are notified about the hearing of the case.
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EVELYN A ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS : PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES, 74 (1996)
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Id.; see also Vincent O. Orlu Nmeheille, The African Human Rights : Its Laws and, Practice and procedure and
Institutions, 236, 2001; Article 52 provides that after the Commission deals with the merits, it draws a report about
the facts and its findings and forward it to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; Article 53 adds that the
Commission while transmitting the report could add a recommendation as it deems fit.
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The recent addition to the African human rights system, i.e., the African Court of Human
Rights, has a mandate to receive individual communications and decide on whether states have
infringed rights contained in the Banjul Charter.467 The mandate of the court relating to
individual’s complaints is expressed under article 3(1). It provides : “The jurisdiction of the
African Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation
and application of the Banjul Charter, this protocol and any other relevant human rights
instruments” 468
When discussing with actual level of execution of the recommendations of the African
Commission, one should start by emphasizing the very low binding status of such
recommendations. 469 The final say on the recommendations remains in the hands of the
assembly of heads of State and government. 470 This arrangement makes the African human
rights system unable to give remedies to individual petitions. 471 The Assembly of Heads of State
and Government has not been diligent in authorizing studies of alleged human rights
violations. 472
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VINCENT O ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS LAWS, PRACTICE AND
INSTITUTIONS,263(2001)
468
One writer maintains that “other relevant human rights” instruments should mean all international human rights
conventions to which African states are parties to and this gives the court mandate to interpret the substance of all
relevant international conventions; see Mukua Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: A two-Legged stool? , 21
Hum. Rts. Q 342, 362, 1999; However mandating the African human rights court to interpret other international
human rights instruments will prove counter-productive in the long run. Such system creates confusion by allowing
various bodies interpret same instruments using their varied standards and thus produce different jurisprudence. This
will create a legitimacy problem to rather young human rights law. Rather a reasonable interpretation will be to
understand it as mandating the court to draw inspiration form such international instruments. The Commission is
also mandated to do this under the Banjul charter.
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On the other hand, the African Commission has also not been known for its
recommendations that authorize monetary payments. 473 Only in very few cases did it recommend
monetary damages. 474 The African Commission has also made recommendations entailing
individual measures 475 and general measures. 476 The African Commission’s early
recommendations exhibit reluctance to indicate clearly specific propositions even where it had
found violations. 477
The major problem, in the African system, has been the blatant disregard for the
recommendations of the African Commission. 478 One example of blatant disregard to the
Commission can be found in two cases against Nigeria. 479 The African Commission in
Constitutional Pen et al and Nigeria 480 found that the Civil Disturbances Act under which the
tribunal tried the applicants to be in violation of the Banjul Charter. 481 A few years later, these
tribunals established under the same established Civil Disturbance Act sentenced Ken Saro –
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Id.
See John K Modise V Botswana, communication 97/ 93, the Commission in its recommendation suggested that
compensation should be paid for the victim without specifying the amount and how it is to be executed. Also in Law
offices of Ghazi Suleiman V Sudan, communications 228/ 98 and 229/98 , the commission urged that the
government of Sudan pay compensation to the victims without specifying the amount and mode of execution.
475
In Constitutional Project Right V Nigeria, Communication no 87/93, the Commission held that the Nigerian
Government should free the complainants, reproduced in 18 HRLJ 30 (1997)
476
In Civil Liberties Organization V Nigeria , Communication 129/94, The Commission held that Decree No 107 of
1997 which suspended the Nigerian Constitution and barred Courts form reviewing actions taken under the Decree
violated articles 7 and 26 of the Banjul Charter and held that the Nigerian Government should nullify the Decree,
reproduced in 18 HRLJ 31 (1997)
477
See, for instance, Krishna Achutan V Malawi , Communication no 64/92, The Commission used one sentence to
render its decision. It reads: “ The Commission finds that the State is in breach of articles 4.5 and 7 of the African
Charter on Human and peoples’ Rights and decides to refer the situation to the assembly of Heads of State and
Government under article 58?1? of the Charter of Human and peoples’ Rights,
http://www1.umn.edu/humanart/africa/comcases/64-92_78-92.html (last visiteed on march 17th 2006)
478
For instance, the interim measure the commission passed to postpone the set execution time of one Ken Saro
Wiwa and 8 other people was disregarded by the Nigerian Government when it executed the persons in favor of the
whom the interim measure was made. ; see generally International Pen et al V Nigeria , communications
137/94,54/96&161/97, reproduced in 21 HRLJ 424, 424-429
479
See The Constitutional Rights Project V Nigeria, communication 87/93,AHG/Res/240(XXXI), reproduced in 18
HRLJ 30,30(1997) and International Pen et al V Nigeria , communications 137/94,54/96&161/97, reproduced in 21
HRLJ 424, 424-429
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Wiwa and eight other persons 482 to death. 483 In giving its recommendations, the African
Commission, “ [r]eiterates its decision on recommendation 87/93 that there has been a violation
of article 7.1(d) 484 with regard to the establishment of the Civil Disturbance Tribunal.” In
ignoring this decision,” The Commision stated, “Nigeria has violated article 1 of the Charter.” 485
Writers have expressed their frustration with the system. Professor Mukua Mutua has
written that both individual complaints and state reporting were disappointing exercises. 486
Another writer has described his frustration by calling the system “a facade, a yoke that African
leaders have put around our necks. 487 The same writer noted that even in some cases where the
African Commission decided on the merits, there was no way of ascertaining whether the state
complied with the decision or not. 488 One writer, although she shared the opinions of these
writers, 489 maintained that there were isolated instances where the African Commission
contributed to the protection of human rights in Africa. 490
5.3 The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights receives individual complaints. 491
Non-governmental organizations can also file complaints with the Inter-American
Commission. 492 The Inter-American Commission has been able to utilize individual
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communications to examine broader violations of human rights. 493 Individual complaints are
subject to admissibility criteria. 494
After receiving a complaint, the Inter-American Commission, requests information from
the accused state and sends out copies of the petition to that state. 495 After receiving a reply from
the accused state or after the state’s failure to reply is established, the Inter-American
Commission proceeds to ascertain whether the facts that led to the petition persist. 496 If grounds
for the complaints cease to exist, the Commission closes the case. 497 If they persist, the InterAmerican Commission then has to ascertain the facts of the case. 498 In the course of ascertaining
the facts of the case, the Inter-American Commission can resort to investigation it deems
necessary. 499 It can request the state to provide information or resort to hearing oral
statements. 500
The Inter-American Commission tries to resolve the dispute between the parties. 501 If a
friendly settlement is reached, the Inter-American Commission forwards the report to the parties
and OAS Secretary General for publication. 502 If the attempt to reach a friendly settlement fails,
then the Inter-American Commission draws up a report summarizing the facts and
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RHONA K M SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 127 ( 2003); see also the discussion on country
reports in chapter three section 3.2 dealing with how the Inter-American Commission used individual complaints to
launch country reports on Argentina and Nicaragua.
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Banjul Charter Art. 46,; According to this article any complaint must exhaust domestic remedies to be pursued
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conclusions. 503 Under article 50/3, 504 the Inter-American Commission has the mandate to make a
recommendation. 505
Within the three months following such a report, either the state or the Commission can
submit the case to the Court. 506 If no such attempt is made during that time, the Inter-American
Commission makes it final report 507 and pertinent recommendations and fixes a timetable for
implementation by the states. 508
The Inter-American Commission, through its recommendations, has awarded monetary
damages, ordered individual and general measures. 509 It has developed a system of following up
on the execution of its recommendations. This practice has its basis in the various
instruments. 510 Article 46 of the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commission mandates
the Inter-American Commission to develop a follow-up procedure such as soliciting information
from the accused state and holding a hearing to assess compliance with its recommendations. In
addition, the General assembly of the OAS has ordered the Inter-American Commission to
continue the practice of annual reporting and follow-up information. 511
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In some cases, the compliance of recommendations has been accomplished through a
friendly settlement. 512 Even in such cases, the Commission might supervise the terms and
execution of friendly settlements. 513 Domestic legal issues have affected compliance to some
extent. 514 The Inter-American Commission assumes non-compliance 515 or even at times declares
it pending compliance 516 in the event of no news of compliance, from either party. 517
States tend to comply more readily with Commission recommendations that impose
monetary obligations on them than recommendations that impose other measures. 518 The InterAmerican Commission also follows up to ensure compliance. 519 In the compliance status
reports 520 in the annual report of the Inter-American Commission, out of a total of sixty cases it

512

See, for instance, Maria Merciadi de Morini V Argentina, case no. 11.307 & Jose Pereira V Brazil, case no.
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See, for instance, in Maria da Penha Frenandes V Brazil, case no 12.051, Brazil gave its federal form of
government as a reason for not revising its laws on domestic violence as recommended by the inter-American
Commission. In the same case it complied with all other recommendations. As recommended by the Commission
Brazil launched various public conferences to raise awareness about the impact of domestic violence ,organized
training for its Police and Law Enforcement Personnel to sensitize them on domestic violence and complied with
symbolic reparation by naming the petitioner for prizes to be handed out by the federal Senate and Chamber of
Deputies and also trying the perpetraotor; In Parque Sao Lucas V Brazil, case number 10.031 , brazil admitted it
had not paid the recommended reparation because it was waiting for a domestic court’s decision on the amount to
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when the Commission declares a case “pending compliance” or “non-compliance” and what the outcome of such a
distinction in labeling.
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was supervising five were declared fully complied with, 29 partially complied with, and twentyseven fully not complied with. From these figures, still admitting error of generalizations, one
can conclude that compliance with the Inter-American Commission recommendations remains
low.
Those cases declared partially complied with were cases in which the states paid the
monetary repatriation but failed to comply with other recommendations. 521 The number of total
non-compliance cases appears to indicate those cases whose compliance the Inter-American
Commission is waiting for compliance.
Another equally important body dealing with individual complaints and execution of
judgments is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 522 It can make decisions entitling the
victims to reparations and can order that violations be stopped. 523
The implementation process has taken many forms. At times, it takes the form of a
continuous negotiation between various stakeholders. 524 At other times, the Inter-American Court
has just simply recognized agreements reached between the victims and the states and monitored
its faithful execution. 525
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In caballero Delgado and Santana against Columbia, for instance, compliance with reparation part of the
judgment took a long negotiation between Columbian government, the court and the victims. As the result of these
negotiations , the suggested form of compliance changed its form several times. Initially the suggested compliance
was just payment made to the victims and later it was made into “a fixed term certificate of deposit” with the
Colombian Government and finally with a specific bank. See generally 199 Annual Report of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/III.47 Doc 6, January 24,2000, paragraphs 37-8, 2000.
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agreement. See generally Annual Report of Inter-American Court of human Rights ,OAe/Ser.L.V/III.54 Doc 4 ,
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States have been inclined more to comply with decisions requiring them to pay money
damages. 526 However, this should not imply that there have been no problems relating to
reparation judgments’ execution. 527 In decisions requiring states to identify and punish
perpetrators, the compliance rate has been very low. 528 Moreover, state compliance depended on
the sensitivity of the issues involved. 529
On a final note, it is appropriate to ask whether the Inter-American Court has a better record of
compliance than the commission. It is, however, difficult to conclude that the Inter-American
Court has better level of compliance than the Inter-American Commission due to states failure to
report their compliance. 530
5.4 The European Human Rights System
The European Convention on Human Rights provides that member states have assumed
an obligation to ensure the enjoyment of all convention rights by everyone. 531 In addition, it
provides that member states abide by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 532
Although these provisions do not say much about the content of the judgments and the power of
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the European Court, 533 articles 1 534 and 46 535 combined give the three responsibilities of states,
i.e., the duty to stop the violation, to pay reparation for the harm caused, and make system reform
to avert the future violations. 536
The European Court, in Papamichalopoulus and other v. Greece, 537 that a violation of the
European Convention had occurred entailing a duty of the state to put an end to the violation and
make reparations to bring victims to the position where the victims would be had it not been for
the violation. 538 However, the European Court on Human Rights does not posses a mandate to
dictate how member states comply with European Court’s decisions. 539 It is up to each state
concerned how to bring about the change pronounced by the decision. 540
In Marckx v. Belgium, 541 the European Court affirmed this proposition. 542 It held that the
European Human Rights Court’s decision might not have a direct consequence in national legal
system, 543 and that it was left to each state to formulate its own means of fulfilling the execution
of judgments. 544 The European Convention makes the Committee of Ministers the responsible
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body for the execution of the decisions of the European Court. 545 Pursuant to this mandate, the
Committee of Ministers has issued rules for the execution of judgments. 546 Under rule 3B, it has
divided judgments of the court into those entailing just satisfaction, individual measures and
general measures. 547 The type of decision the European Court gives, therefore, dictates the type
of remedial measures states take to comply with the decision of the European Court. 548 Pursuant
to these rules of execution of judgments, which the Council of Ministers developed, the
Committee of Ministers can keep any outstanding judgment on its future agenda indefinitely. 549
Alternatively, the Committee of Ministers can also take a persistently defaulting state to the
European Court of Human Rights to force execution of judgments. 550 The Council of Europe
statute, when articles 3 and 8 are read together, 551 empowers the Committee of Ministers to
suspend any persistent defying state from membership in the Council of Europe. 552 Beside the
Committee of Ministers, the Assembly of the Parliament of the Council of Europe has assumed
some responsibility in regards to execution of judgments. 553
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See Rules Adopted by the Committee of Ministers for the Application of Article 46 , paragraph 2, of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Adopted on January 10.2001,reproduced in 24 HRLJ 281 , 2003 and also
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The real test for this adjudicatory system is the level of effective remedies accorded to
individuals. 554 European states, in general, have exhibited readiness to execute the judgments of
the European Court 555 and the defunct European Commission of Human Rights. 556 The
compliance level of the European Commission was described as “not only generally complied
with by the contracting states concerned, although noting some delays in compliance[...]” 557 The
European Court also suffers from similar delays in compliance. 558
Regarding decisions of the European Court of Human Rights requiring states to pay
money to victims, the delay in paying or failure to confirm payment has been a critical issue.559
In cases in which the default is less than six months, France, Italy and Turkey are the main
defaulters with 43, 120 and 34 defaults respectively. 560 In cases involving defaults more than six
months, the major defaulting states are France, Italy, and Turkey with 22, 51, and 12 defaults
respectively. 561
Concerns about non-compliance also exist concerning individual measures, where
Turkey alone accounts for more than 110 cases of non-compliance.562 Non-compliance with
decisions of the Court has to certain extent, been traced to reasons related to domestic legal,
economic and other issues. 563
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Some states have exhibited particular delinquency in complying with the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights. 564 But these exceptional holdouts in some cases, though
issues for concern, should not create a gloomy picture of the level of compliance in the European
human rights system of execution of judgments 565 and the efficacy of the system in prompting
positive changes in legal systems of the countries. 566

Greece, Greece tried to justify its inability to pay the money as required by the decision of the court by invoking its
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Chapter Six
Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the paper draws conclusions based on the preceding chapters. Conclusions
made in each chapter are reiterated here. Recommendations draw on the conclusions. However,
unlike the rest of the paper, conclusions and recommendations follow a system-by-system
approach. The recommendations given here are specific to each system.
6.2 The African Human Rights System
6.2.1 State Reporting
Under the African human rights system, some improvements are needed if state reporting
is to have a noteworthy impact on human rights conditions on the continent.
6.2.1.1 Creation of a System of Incentives and Disincentives
African States have not been very diligent regarding submission of state reports. To
change this tendency, adopting a system that contains an incentive or applies negative
reinforcement to bring about a certain pattern of conduct will salvage the system.
6.2.1.1.1

Establishing a Fee Based System

A late or a non-submission fee levied against any state that does not submit on time
would prompt states to submit reports on time. The assumption is that states would react to a
sanction they would face for not submitting a state report.
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To add efficacy to this arrangement, the African Commission could be empowered to
decide whether a state is late in presenting its report and so subject to the late fee penalty. It
should also be empowered to bring a case to the African Court of Human Rights to have an
enforceable judgment against such a state, which the Council of Ministers of the African Union
would have to supervise the execution just like any other decision of the African Court on
Human Rights.
Many scholars have rightly pointed out their skepticism of the political feasibility of such
a system. This is a valid point. However, the introduction of fee-based systems would put
blemish on a state’s image both in the international relations arena and in domestic politics of the
state. The role of such a system to serve as a catalyst in prompting state compliance should not
be underestimated.
6.2.1.1.2

Production of Country Reports

Another approach would be to empower the African Commission to produce and adopt a
country report in lieu of an absent state reporting. The assumption is that it would prompt states
to submit reports on time to avoid the harassment of being subjected to country reporting.
The preparation of such country reports can benefit a great deal from the participation of
local NGOs, which are already playing a major role in the state reporting system by providing
“shadow” reports that the African Commission utilizes when it examines states reports. The
production of country reports instead of the expected state reports serve as a disincentive to
failure to report or delay in reporting.
The importance of the power of country reports is evident from the experience of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The African Commission of Human Rights
should exploit its mandate to carry out a site visit to prepare its country reports. It should also be
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born in mind that the African Commission should also learn from the weakness of the country
reports of the Inter-American system and should take clear stands in its reports.
6.2.1.1.3

Increased Publicity

Increased publicity of state reports or even country reports can play even a greater role
than they are playing now if they have better publicity with the right groups. The assumption is
that by linking these reports with organs or bodies in which states have a big stake, the state
reporting system can play a greater role on the enforcement of human rights in the region. Such
reports, for instance, could be forwarded to international organizations that deal with
international monetary disbursement. These organizations include, among others, the
International Monetary Fund 567 , the World Bank 568 and the African Development Bank. 569 These
institutions make policy decisions affecting African states and can play a large role in overseeing
human rights situations in Africa. Because this increased publicity gives these international
institutions some relevant information they need to make policy decisions towards aid recipient
states, these reports certainly enhance their ability to make policy decisions.
Still the bigger point is that African states, for fear of adverse decisions against them by
these monetary institutions, would report on time and most importantly would earnestly try to
improve human rights situations in their jurisdiction.

567

It is an organization established with the pupose of “to promote international money co-operation; the expansion
and balanced growth of international trade, to promote exchange rate stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangement and prevent competitive depreciation[ ].” See EVA REISENHUBER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
UNDER CONSTARINT,4 (2004)
568
Initially the World Bank was established to reconstruct war-stricken Europe. Later on , it evolved into
international financial institution which aims to reduce poverty and improve living standars in developing world.
Within it the World Bank has five institutions, each with its own area of specialization. See The World bank, The
world Bank, 3-11)2003)
569
African Development Bank aims at assisting African states in their economic development, both each state and
jointly. It can supply funds for Any Member State or any political sub-division within the territory of a Member
State. See JOHN WHITE, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, 104(1972) and also http://www.afdb.org (last
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Another form of publicity comes from linking such reports to local communities. These
communities have direct knowledge and experience of the activities and governance records of
African states. Therefore, giving them direct access to such reports will increase their awareness
of their state’s activities outside the country and prompt them to exert pressure at least at the
election polls. This creates enormous pressure on the states to produce on time reports and really
care about their actions for fear of repetitive censure at the polls. This kind of publicity is
achievable through the publication of the contents of the reports and the discussions that would
ensue following the presentation of the reports.
6.2.1.2 Create a Link with International Fund Dispersing Organizations
As indicated above, the creation of such a linkage between international monetary
organizations and the regional human rights system, apart from promotion of compliance for fear
of publicity, will work as a substantive deterrent to actual human rights violations. The impact of
such institutions on developing states is enormous. This influence should be channeled to impact
human rights situations in Africa. The reports produced by African states or the country reports
produced by the African Commission should be submitted to these organizations for
consideration in their policymaking towards African states.
6.2.1.3 Content of Reports
Another frequently encountered problem in the state reporting system has been the
content of state reports. Lack of uniformity in regard to the content of the reports has been a
persistent problem and one that needs remedying if the state reporting mechanism is to produce
any meaningful results. The African Commission has tried to ameliorate the problem by issuing
guidelines as to the contents of state reports. However, these guidelines have not helped a great
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deal. Many state representatives have indicated during discussions that they did not know about
the guidelines during discussions.
The way to get around this problem is that the African Commission should make these
guidelines and sample state reports available online so that any relevant authority of any state in
charge of preparing state reports would be able to access them. The availability of the guidelines
online will address the claim of unavailability made by state representatives. The availability of
sample reports will address the issue of lack of uniformity in terms of the contents of such
reports submitted by states.
6.2.1.4. Presentation of reports
Another problem area relates to the presentation of reports to the African Commission.
The practice indicates that states mostly do not send a representative at all, or even when they do,
they do not send a person with appropriate rank and authority to speak for the government on all
issues. This problem can be addressed by fixing the level of rank of the person representing the
state in front of the African Commission and taking any default in this regard as a complete nonsubmission of report and thus should prompt the African Commission to adopt a country report.
6.2.2 Inter-State Complaints
The African Commission has not received many inter state-complaints. The only viable
complaint has been just one. African states do not seem to want to point fingers at each other.
This can be addressed by allowing certain non-African states or organizations to have standing
before the Commission to bring actions against African states. This would remove the mutually
protectionist environment developed by African states.
The experience of inter-state complaints that have existed until today might cast doubts
on the relevance of allowing non-African states to bring cases against African states before the
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African Commission of Human Rights. Provided the rights of non-African States to bring cases
before the African Commission are confined to cases that reveal vast and systematic violations
and not individual cases, it will certainly improve the inter-state complaint mechanism in Africa.
Most democratic nations have been exploiting various means to end severe human rights
violations. If they are given this right, they will certainly make use of it.
The issue of allowing a non-African state or institution standing before the Commission
will certainly face strong resistance from many, especially African, states. However, one should
not forget that donor countries and institutions have already been doing this in other political
arenas and giving it a legitimate face concerning human rights would not be such a drastic move.
Decisions produced by the African Commission should be linked to international
organizations in the same way discussed above in relation to state reports, in order to create an
environment, with sufficient incentives and disincentives to make African states take their
obligations earnestly.
One other concern that needs some consideration is how the NEPAD system fares in
connection with the inter-state complaints mechanism. In the Inter-American system, it is easily
noticeable how the country report system undermined the development of an inter-state
complaints mechanism. Can that situation be true of the relation between NEPAD and the interstate complaint system in the African system? States not wanting point fingers at each other in
front of international adjudicatory bodies would rather resort to the political system offered by
NEPAD.
Even if this happens, it is possible that inter-state dialogue under the framework of NEPAD can
bring improvement to human rights situations on the continent provided that NEPAD retains its
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close relationship with the international community and is able to create serious consequences on
states.
6.2.2 Individual Complaints and Execution of Judgments
The current system has a Commission and a Court. Individuals and non-governmental
organizations do not have direct access to the African Court unless the states expressly make a
declaration to this effect. The only way individuals can access the court is through the African
Commission when it takes cases to the African Court.
The practice of the African Commission taking individual cases to the African Court has
many shortcomings. Experience of the Inter-American system suggests that such an arrangement
can really undermine the efficiency of the court and eventually the entire system. In Chapter One
section 1.3.1.2, a variety of relations between the African Commission and Court were
suggested. However, the best system is one where there is a complete division of labor between
the two organs. The African Commission should retain the promotional activities, the state
reporting and the inter-state complaints mechanisms and the African Court should have exclusive
jurisdiction over the private complaints.
Another danger of the current arrangement is the application of different standards to
cases exhibiting similar circumstances. The European experience indicates that the European
Commission and the Court applied different standards and thus created uncertainty in the system.
Regarding the execution of judgments in the African system, there is not much to say.
There is even dispute among African and other human rights lawyers whether the Commission
has a mandate to make enforceable decisions and even it has a mandate to receive individual
complaints. Leaving aside intellectual arguments, the African Commission’s ability to execute its
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decisions (i.e., recommendations) has been a disaster. There is nothing to show what it has done
to execute its decisions.
The ultimate authority in the system, i.e., the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government has not also been keen on doing anything about it after hearing reports of the
African Commission.
Currently, the establishment of African Human Rights Court has partially remedied this
problem. However, it remains to be seen how much the African Court will improve this problem.
It is premature to speculate at all about the Court’s performance since it has just been
established.
6.3 The Inter-American Human Rights System
6.3.1 State reporting and Country Reporting
The Inter-American system has not developed state reporting mechanisms. Rather, it has
relied heavily on country reports. So long as country reports can produce the desired result for
making states take their international human rights obligations seriously, there is no need that the
system to have a well-developed state reporting mechanism.
Regarding country reports, few suggestions can be made to enhance their impact on the
protection human rights.
6.3.2.1 OAS General Assembly to Take a Position on Country Reports
A discussion on this issue in the relevant chapter and section revealed that the OAS
General Assembly does not take a firm stand or position on country reports. To do away with
this handicap affecting the efficacy of the mechanism, it should be made mandatory that the OAS
General Assembly take a clear stand on the report. The General Assembly should indicate in
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clear terms whether the state in question has violated human rights or not and, if possible, go so
far as to the extent of suggesting measures to be taking regarding such violations.
6.3.2.2 Link Country Reports and OAS Assembly General Deliberations to Relevant
International Institutions
Copies of country reports and deliberations of the OAS political organs should be
transmitted to international organizations entrusted with disbursement of funds to developing
countries. The rationale behind such approach is the same as the one for the African system, i.e.,
to create publicity as one means of coercing states to comply with their international obligations
and to establish additional incentive and disincentive systems to.
Conditions on aid have been complained about widely for many years. However, the fact
remains that all aid will remain conditional on some considerations. This is a fact of international
politics. Already situation of human rights are considerations for these international
organizations and giving this a legal basis will not change anything.
6.3.2 Inter-State Complaints
The inter-state complaints mechanism has been undermined by the reliance on the InterAmerican system country reports. The ability of the Inter-American Commission to produce
country reports has enabled it to channel potential inter-state complaints into country reports.
The Inter-State complaint mechanism has not worked effectively in Europe and especially in
Africa. The member states of OAS might not have used it effectively either. Because country
reports are produced without the involvement of member states, the course taken by the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission has enabled it to make up for any losses they might have
been caused by the absence of inter-state complaints in its system. Therefore, if the system is
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able to make up for the loss in the protection of human rights it sustains from the unavailability
of inter-state complaints, then it is a tolerable loss.
6.3.3 Individual Complaints and Execution of Judgments
The system has a Commission and a Court. However, individual complainants do not
have access to the Court unless states expressly acknowledge the Inter-American Court’s
jurisdiction to hear individual complaints. Outside this option, the only way individual
complaints can make it to the Inter-American Court is when the Inter-American Commission
takes their cases to the Inter-American Court. This arrangement suffers from many drawbacks.
First, there are no set criteria to decide which cases go to the Inter-American Court and which do
not. This creates arbitrariness. Second, it creates room for a competitive, rather than cooperative,
working atmosphere. This has been seen clearly in the initial stage of the Inter-American Court.
Such intra-system problems ultimately affect victims. Third, as indicated above, the InterAmerican Commission and the Court might apply varied standards cases with similar facts.
To do away with such problems, a system with a clear division of labor should be
established. The Inter-American Commission should retain its promotional activities and the
country reporting mechanism, thus leaving the Court with exclusive jurisdiction over private
complaints.
6.4 The European Human Rights System
6.4.1 State reporting and Country reports
The European system relies heavily on individual complaints. However, as much as
individual complaints are important to the protection human rights, one should not forget that
they fail to expose the overall picture of human rights prevailing in countries. They only allow
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the court to see individual complaints one at a time and thus deny it a macro-level view of the
human rights situations in member states.
The system of country reports was developed in the Inter-American system out of the
realization that individual complaints insufficiently curb vast rights violations. So the European
system will benefit by establishing either a state reporting or a country report system. This,
however, does not mean that the European system does not have any state reporting or country
reports presented on an ad hoc basis. The system allows its political organs to request states to
produce human rights situation reports or to request its own organs to produce reports similar to
country reports.
Moreover, the European human rights system, after realizing the weakness resulting from
reliance on individual complaints, adopted a resolution to authorize the Commissioner of Human
Rights to report on human rights situation in member states. However, it appears that it should be
given more constitutional foundations through an amendment to the European Convention.
These ad hoc “practices resembling state reports” and this mandate given to the Commissioner
for Human Rights should be merged on more constitutional grounds to give efficiency to the
European System and also avoid redundancy.
6.4.2 Individual Complaints and Execution of Judgments
Given the current state of international law and its principle of sovereignty, the European
Court has been very effective in dealing with individual complaints and executing its judgments.
The European Court of Human Rights deals only with individual and inter-state complaints. Its
decisions are regularly enforced. European States take their human rights obligations seriously.
The weakness of the European human rights system, as discussed above, lies in its heavy
reliance on its court system. There are situations that such individual complaints do not simply
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disclose at face value. As much as the European Court of Human Rights has been successful in
its functions, it has limitations in addressing broad violations of human rights. Therefore, the
European System should also revamp its activities that are similar to reporting.
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